Bounding the price of anarchy (PoA), which quantifies the degradation in the quality of outcomes in a (pure) Nash equilibrium of a game, is one of the fundamental questions in computational game theory. However, for a large class of games, a pure NE may not always exist and hence a natural question to pursue is to quantify the inefficiency for weaker notions of equilibrium such as mixed Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium or coarse correlated equilibrium, all of which are known to exist for finite games. Several techniques have been developed for bounding the price of anarchy, yet, only a handful of them are applicable for proving the PoA bounds for general equilibrium concepts. Most notable among such techniques is Roughgarden's elegant smoothness framework, which led to the concept of robust price of anarchy. The term refers to the inefficiency bounds applicable to general equilibrium notions such as coarse correlated equilibrium.
Introduction
Self-interested actions of agents in strategic settings often result in suboptimal equilibrium outcomes. In the seminal work [27] , Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou proposed the concept of price of anarchy (PoA) as a formal way to quantify this degradation. For a given social cost function, the PoA of a game is defined as the ratio of the worstcase social cost of an outcome in (pure) Nash equilibrium (NE) to the cost of an optimal solution. The definition can be naturally extended to include outcomes in more general notions of equilibria, such as mixed Nash equlibria (MNE), correlated equlibria (CE) and coarse correlated equilibria (CCE), all of which are strict generalizations of pure NE. In fact, for any game NE ⊆ MNE ⊆ CE ⊆ CCE. The notions of correlated equilibrium and coarse correlated equilibrium have several desirable properties: for any finite game, these equilibria always exist, and can be computed and learned in polynomial time [24, 14] . This is in contrast to pure NE which may not exist, or MNE which cannot always be efficiently computed.
A variety of techniques have been developed to prove the PoA bounds for a wide range of problems. Of particular interest in this context are the techniques that can be used to bound the PoA for general equilibrium notions such as CE or CCE. The most general among such techniques is the widely used smoothness framework of Roughgarden [33] . Roughgarden's framework distills the essence of many PoA proofs known in the literature and gives a canonical proof template to establish PoA bounds which simultaneously extend to MNE, CE and CCE. Yet, for many games of practical and theoretical interest, such as temporal routing games, it is not clear how to apply smoothness framework to obtain non-trivial bounds on the PoA.
Our Results
In this paper, we present a new framework based on the concept of LP and Fenchel duality for establishing the PoA bounds for general equilibrium concepts.The main technical contribution of the paper is the following:
For a wide class games where the social objective is sum of costs incurred by players, one can formulate the underlying optimization problem as linear or convex program such that the dual of the relaxation encodes the equilibrium condition.
Further, the dual program has a variable for each player and each resource, which can be interpreted as the cost incurred by the player and utilization of the resource in an equilibrium outcome. Once the variables are defined this way, we appeal to the weak duality theorem to establish the PoA bounds. We demonstrate the broad applicability of this dual-fitting technique in two ways. First, we show that many classical PoA results easily follow from our framework. As representative examples, we consider weighted affine congestion games [5, 17] , simultaneous second price auctions [19] , competitive facility-location games [35] and give alternate proofs of tightness of the PoA bounds for general equilibrium notions. Moreover, we show the technique easily extends to bounding the inefficiency for other equilibrium notions such as k-lookahead equilibrium [31] or approximate NE.
Second, and more important contribution is that we use the dual-fitting framework to get the first PoA bounds for general equilibrium concepts for some natural classes of games, for which the techniques known in the literature seem difficult to apply.
1) Coordination Mechanisms For Temporal Routing
Games. We study the temporal routing games in the framework of coordination mechanisms [18] . Unlike congestion games, which were also studied in the context of selfish routing, the temporal routing games model the queueing nature of routing in real networks and has been an active area of research in recent years [20, 28, 6, 15, 21, 8, 9] . The specific model we consider is the following: Given a graph G = (V, E) and a set of packets, each packet has a size p j , a weight or priority w j , and wants to travel from some source h j ∈ V to some destination o j ∈ V . The strategy set S j for a packet consists of a subset of all possible simple paths between vertices h j to o j . Each edge e ∈ E has a speed ν e , a packet j takes pj νe units of time to traverse the edge. Our goal is to design local forwarding policies on each edge -which determine the packet which will be forwarded when multiple packets try to use the same edge-which lead to games with small PoA. Given a forwarding policy, each packet chooses the path which gives it the minimum weighted delay or the weighted sojourn time. The social cost is the sum of costs incurred by players. Let |P i | denote the length of path P i . We first show the following result. This is the first analysis of local forwarding policies for temporal routing games on arbitrary graphs and answers a question raised by Cole et al. in [21] . Our result implies that PoA is independent of number packets and depends solely on structure of the network. Previous known results for this problem could only handle restricted topologies such as tree networks [9] or parallel links [21, 8] . Further, our result matches the tight robust PoA bound of 4 for HDF policy obtained by Cole et al. in [21] using smoothness framework and generalizes the results in [8, 9] to CCE. Constant-factor approximation algorithms can be inferred from the works of [29, 30] for the underlying optimization problem in the offline setting, however, no analysis of local forwarding policies (such as HDF) are known. Interestingly, we also show that the dependence on D may be unavoidable, even for very simple settings. THEOREM 1.2. The price of anarchy of temporal routing games is at least D 16 when each edge uses a priority-based forwarding policy (such as Shortest Job First). This holds even for the special case when all packets have unit size, and same source and destination.
The lower bound is based on a carefully chosen example, and highlights the interplay between short paths and connectivity of graphs in NE outcomes. It also shows that coordination mechanisms with provable PoA are intrinsically harder for general graphs compared to trees. Finally, we show that there are NE with special combinatorial structures for which inefficiency bounds can be improved. This result is achieved by a careful understanding of the dual constraints and proving structural lemmas about a class of equilibrium points. THEOREM 1.3. The price of stability of temporal routing games is at most 4 · D when each edge follows the Shortest Job First forwarding policy, for the case when all packets have the same source and weight.
This result shows that dual fitting is a useful tool for the price of stability analysis and dual constraints can be used to find equilibria with good efficiency. As a corollary of this result, we improve the PoA of CCE for tree topologies considered in [9] from O(log 2 ν) to O(log ν), where ν is the ratio of maximum speed of any edge to minimum speed. The result in [9] applied only to the PoA of pure NE.
2) Energy Minimization Games in Machine Scheduling. Minimizing energy consumption is a fundamental problem in wide range of applications -from data center scheduling to mobile devices with small batteries -and has been an active area of research both in theory and practice [2, 7, 3, 23] . One of the important theoretical models of this problem in machine scheduling literature is the following. We are given a set of machines and a set jobs. Each job j has a processing length p ij on machine i and a weight w ij . Each machine can run at variable speed. If a machine is run at the speed level s it consumes energy s γ , where γ is some fixed constant (typically 2 or 3 in practice.) The objective is to design scheduling and speed scaling algorithms which minimize the energy consumed while simultaneously guaranteeing certain quality of service (QoS), such as sum of weighted completion times or weighted delays of jobs. One of the most commonly used algorithm for this problem is the following: Each machine schedules the jobs using Highest Density First Scheduling policy (HDF) and chooses the speed level such that total power consumed is equal to the total weight of jobs which have not yet finished. This intuitive algorithm has been shown to perform well both in theory and practice [7, 3, 23] .
We take a look at this problem from a game theoretic lens. We treat jobs as selfish agents which choose the machine which gives them the smallest weighted completion time. Again, the social cost is sum of costs incurred by players and our objective is to understand the PoA of the resulting game. THEOREM 1.4. The price of anarchy of energy minimization games for coarse correlated equilibrium is at most O(γ).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result (along with the affine weighted congestion games proof in this paper) which uses Fenchel duality to obtain PoA bounds. As noted earlier, tight results are known for the optimization version of this problem [23, 3] .
Preliminaries
Consider a cost minimization game G with N players and each player j ∈ N having a strategy space S j . Let θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ), where θ j ∈ S j , denote a strategy profile of strategies taken by the players. We refer to a strategy profile θ as an outcome.
An outcome θ is in pure NE if for every j ∈ N and for all i ∈ S j , Cost j (θ) ≤ Cost j (i, θ −j ).
A set of independent probability distributions (σ 1 , σ 2 , . . . , σ n ) over strategy sets of players is a mixed Nash equilibrium of a game if for all j ∈ N , and for all
Here, σ denotes the product distribution. The concept of mixed NE strictly generalizes the pure NE.
A joint probability distribution σ over the outcomes of a game is said to be a correlated equilibrium, if for all j ∈ N , and for all
Correlated equilibrium is a strict generalization of mixed NE.
A further generalization of correlated equilibrium is coarse correlated equilibrium. A distribution σ over outcomes of a game is a coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) if for all j ∈ N , and for all
In the context of repeated games, a CCE corresponds to the limiting distribution of a sequence of plays that are no regret for every player.
Finally, the robust PoA is the worst case ratio of expected social cost of a distribution in CCE to the optimal solution to the instance (in non-strategic settings). Let OPT denote the optimal solution to the instance (G, N , ∪ j S j ).
OPT .
Our Techniques: Dual-fitting for Congestion Games
All our results are obtained using the dual fitting technique. Instead of explaining the technique in abstract terms, we give a concrete example which captures the essence of our main idea. As a warm-up example, we consider the affine weighted atomic congestion games. All the variants of congestion games are extensively studied in the literature and tight results are known for very general settings [5, 17, 13, 16, 33, 10, 1, 34] . A (slightly) generalized version of this cost minimization game with unrelated weights is as follows: consider a set of N players and a set of E resources. For each player j ∈ N , the strategy set S j ⊆ 2 E is given. For the special case of network congestion games, the set of resources correspond to edges of a graph and strategies correspond to source-destination paths in the graph. Here, we will use edges and resources interchangeably. For an outcome θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . θ n ), where each θ j ∈ S j , the cost incurred by player j is given by the affine cost function Cost j (θ) = e∈θj w ej · (a e · e (θ) + b e ), where e (θ) is the load on the (resource) edge e ∈ E. In weighted congestion games, the load on an edge is given by e (θ) = j :e∈θ j w ej , which is simply the total weight of players using that edge. The goal of each player is to minimize the cost incurred, and the social cost is the sum of cost incurred by players. Observe that the social cost, Cost(θ) = j Cost j (θ), can also be written as j e∈θ j wej · (ae · e(θ) + be) = e e(θ) · (ae · e(θ) + be)
Even before the smoothness proof of [33] , the PoA for general equilibrium concepts such as MNE, CCE were obtained in [5, 17, 13, 16] . We give a new proof of this result using Fenchel duality.
(Note: Although all our proofs are stated in terms of CCE, it is instructive to think of just pure NE to get the main idea.)
Step 1. Convex program and Fenchel dual: For every player j and strategy i ∈ S j , define L ij = e∈i w ej · (a e w ej +b e ). L ij is precisely the cost incurred by player j for the strategy i, if she were the only player to play the strategy. Consider the following primal convex programming relaxation (Congestion − Primal) for the underlying optimization problem. Here, we have a variable x ij for every player j and for strategy i ∈ S j in the strategy space for player j, which set to 1 if the player j chooses the strategy i. The variable y e for every edge e ∈ E indicates the load on edge e in a solution.
The first constraint says that every player chooses a strategy. The second constraint enforces that y e should be at least the load on edge e in any outcome. Consider the objective function: the second term in the objective function is at most the sum of the costs incurred by players, as noted earlier. The first term in the objective function states that the total cost incurred by a player j for playing a strategy is at least the cost of playing the strategy assuming j is the only player in the game. (In fact, without this term the convex program has a large integrality gap. Consider a single player choosing an edge in a graph with n parallel edges. The convex program incurs a cost of 1/n 2 by choosing each edge to an extent 1/n, while, in any outcome player has to pay at least 1. On the other hand, this term is not needed for non-atomic games.) From the construction, it is not hard to see that the convex program is a valid relaxation of the problem and an optimal solution to this convex program is at most 2-approximation to the cost of any optimal solution. We lose a factor of 2 here due to the term j i∈Sj (x ij · L ij ). As explained earlier, the term lowerbounds the total cost incurred players, and is needed to fix the integrality gap of the convex program. We are ready to write the Fenchel dual of Congestion − Primal. For readers not familiar with Fenchel duality, we refer to [22, 23] for an excellent discourse on the topic.
We give a brief explanation on how to derive Fenchel dual of a convex program with linear constraints. As a first step, we ignore the convex part of the objective function and write a dual similar to a LP dual. Now, consider the convex part of objective function. Suppose f (y) is the convex part of the objective function. Then the dual objective will have the function −f * (µ), where f
4 . Moreover, every variable which occurs in the convex part of the objective function has an extra variable µ in the dual which appears in the right hand side of the constraint corresponding to it.
The second step of the proof is to show a setting of dual variables which gives a feasible solution to the dual. Consider any distribution σ over outcomes of the game, where no player can decrease her expected cost using unilateral deviations. Such a distribution σ is a coarse correlated equilibrium of the game. Now we show using a simple dual fitting argument that for any such distribution the PoA for weighted congestion games is at most 1 + φ, where φ is the golden ratio.
Step 2. Setting The Dual Variables. We set the dual variables α j , β e , and µ e as follows:
• We set α j to the expected cost incurred by player j in σ:
• We set β e and µ e proportional to the expected load on the edge e: β e = µ e = a e · E θ∼σ [ e (θ))].
As we shall see, throughout the paper, we interpret the dual variables corresponding to players as the cost incurred by players in an equilibrium. Similarly, we interpret the dual variables corresponding to resources (or edges) as the congestion on the resource. We encourage the readers to think of pure NE rather than CCE: then α j is the cost incurred by the player j and β e is the load on edge e in a NE.
Step 3. Bounding The Dual Objective. From the definition of dual variables, the term e 1 4ae ·µ 2 e in the dual objective is equal to e
2 , which is at most 1/4 times the sum of expected cost of players in σ. This follows from Jensen's inequality 1 and linearity of expectation as shown below.
1 For any random variable X and any convex function g, g(
Therefore, by the weak duality theorem, the cost of primal optimum is at least
Since the primal is at most 2-approximation to the optimal solution, we get a bound of 8/3 on the robust PoA. To get the tight bound of
2 , we first scale the term i,j (x ij · L ij ) by 1 λ (which means, the primal program is (1 + 1/λ)-approximation to opt). Then we scale the dual variables α j , β e and µ e also by 1 λ . Note that dual constraints are continued to be satisfied with this change. A routine calculation shows that this will give a bound of
4λ−1 ) on the robust PoA, which we can optimize to get the tight bound of
Step 4. Verifying The Dual Constraints. We will show that our definition of the dual variables satisfy the dual constraints. Recall that there is a constraint (2.1) for every pair of player j and strategy i ∈ S j :
Consider a player j and a strategy i ∈ S j . Let E θ∼σ [Cost j (i, θ −j )] be the expected cost incurred by player j for playing the strategy i, fixing everyone else's strategy. From the definition of L ij we note that for every outcome θ,
for all i, where i is not the strategy chosen by player j in θ. Similarly, Cost j (i, θ −j ) = e∈i w ej · (a e · e (θ) + b e ), if i is equal to the strategy chosen by player j in outcome θ. In other words, for all outcomes θ and for all i, we have
This is true, since we set β e to a e · E θ∼σ [ e (θ)].
In order to verify that constraint (2.1) is satisfied, we do the following thought experiment: We first pretend that
Then, the definition of dual variables imply that dual constraint (2.1) corresponding to player j and strategy i is satisfied. However, α j is set to E θ∼σ [Cost j (θ)], and not E θ∼σ [Cost j (i, θ −j )]. Now we use the fact that σ is a coarse correlated equilibrium and
. From this perspective, the dual constraints (2.1) encode the equilibrium definition that fixing the strategies of the other players, no player can increase her utility (or decrease cost) by unilateral deviations! From this fact, we will conclude that our setting of dual variables satisfy the dual constraints and we get robust bounds on PoA.
Observe that in order to prove that our setting of the dual variables satisfy the dual constraints, it is enough to verify the following: Consider any outcome θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . θ n ). We check that the dual constraints (2.1) corresponding to player j and strategy i ∈ S j are satisfied if we assume that α j = Cost j (i, θ −j ) and β e = a e · e (θ). Since σ is a distribution over outcomes, the constraints will also be satisfied by
Finally, we use the fact that σ is a coarse correlated equilibrium and hence
satisfies all the dual constraints simultaneously. REMARK 2.1.
• Note that our proof can be easily extended to non-atomic setting to obtain 4/3 PoA. For this setting we do not need the L ij term in the convex programming relaxation.
• Readers familiar with Roughgarden's [33] smoothness framework can draw an analogy here. The dual argument replaces the smoothness inequality to verifying the dual constraints. It would be interesting to explore if there is a formal connection between these frameworks.
k-look ahead Equilibria. Next, we give a sketch of the proof to get a bound of
2 on the inefficiency of for k-look ahead equilibria for affine unweighted congestion games. No results were known previously for this case, except when k = 2. See [31, 12] for more details. First we observe that if a strategy profile θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . θ n ) is in k-lookahead equilibrium, it satisfies the following inequality for every player j and strategy i ∈ S j : e∈i a e ·( e (θ)+k)+b e ≥ e∈θj a e ·( e (θ)−max{k, e (θ)})+b e Note that θ j here denotes the strategy of player j in the outcome θ and i is any strategy in the strategy space of player j. We emphasize that the above inequality is only a sufficient condition (and perhaps a weak one). However, this is enough to get the desired bound on PoA.
To show the bound on the PoA, we set α j to be
. Therefore, this setting of dual variables will imply that the cost of primal program is at least 3 4k 2 the cost of θ, which gives a bound of 8/3 · k 2 on the coordination ratio (a term used in [31] ). To get better the bound, we first scale primal and dual variables by 1/λ and the first term in the primal objective by 1/λ to get the coordination ratio as a function of λ which we optimize to get the bound of
It is easy to verify that dual constraints are satisfied with our definition of dual variables and this completes the proof.
More related work
To the best of our knowledge, there are very few instances ( [8, 9, 32, 11, 12] ) in the literature where dual-fitting or primal-dual ideas are used in proving the PoA bounds and none of them use Fenchel duality. The works of Bhattacharya et al. in ( [8, 9] ) come closest to the spirit in which we use the technique, however, they do not consider CCE. There are two other works [32, 11] in the literature which use primal-dual ideas which need a comparison. The main idea in [32, 11] is to write a LP to the process of bounding the PoA itself, where as we write LP/CP to the underlying optimization problem. In fact, [32] study the problem of finding the largest class of equilibrium concept for which smoothness bounds apply. Hence, in these works, variables of LP represent strategies ( [32] ) or payoffs ( [11] ) of players in an equilibrium and optimal solution, and constraints of primal enforce the equilibrium definition. On the other hand, our primal programs are independent of the equilibrium concepts and only lower bound the optimal social cost. Although techniques in [32, 11] are interesting in their own right, in our opinion, do not easily generalize to more complicated settings (such as temporal routing games or energy minimization games)
Limitations
Although the dual-fitting technique seems to be very useful in bounding the PoA for a wide range of problems, it has some intrinsic limitations. A major drawback of the technique is the integrality gap of the LP/CP relaxations, which impose an implicit restriction on the tightness of the results one can obtain using this technique. Another limitation of the technique, at least as developed in this work, is that it only works when the social cost is a convex function. Nevertheless, we hope that our technique finds more applications, especially in the context of analyzing games for which underlying optimization problems have nice duality based (approximation) algorithms, such as network design games [4] .
3 More Examples 3.1 Simultaneous Second-Price Auctions In this problem, we are given a set M of items and a set N of users. Each user j ∈ N has a non-negative valuation v j (T ) for every subset of items T ⊆ M. We assume that valuation functions are submodular. Each user submits a bid b ij for
. . b mj ) corresponds to the bid by player j for all the items i ∈ M, the items are allocated independently using the second-price auction (giving the item to the highest bidder and charging the second highest bid). A strategy for a player j corresponds to a bid
Given a bid profile b, let Z j (b) denote the set of items agent j wins. The payoff for an agent j is defined as
is the second highest bid for the item i in b. The objective is to maximize the social welfare, which includes the sum of users payoffs and the revenue from the auctioneer. Let W (b) denote the welfare of the bid vector b. Note that
Christodoulou et al. showed the game has a PoA of at most 2 (which is tight) [19] . Roughgarden [33] reinterpreted this proof using the smoothness framework which automatically implies a bound of 2 for mixed NE, correlated equilibria (CE), and coarse CE. We now give a dual-fitting proof of these results, which matches the these bounds. LP Formulation and Dual: Consider the configuration LP formulation for the problem given below. Here, we have a variable x jT for every subset of items T ⊆ M and every agent j ∈ N , which indicates if the set of items T is allocated to the agent j. The first constraint ensures that no item is over-allocated, while the second constraint says that each agent receives exactly one set. The objective finds the (fractional) allocation which maximizes the social welfare.
Now consider the dual. Here we have a variable α j for every player j and a variable β i for item i.
Setting The Dual Variables: Given a distribution σ which is in CCE, we set the dual variables in the most natural way.
• We set α j to the expected payoff of player j under the distribution σ;
• We set β i to the expected value of highest bid for the item i in σ. That is,
Bounding The Dual Objective: Since bids are constrained to satisfy i∈T b ij ≤ V j (T ), for all subsets of items T and agents j, we have
Therefore, from the weak duality theorem,
Checking The Dual Constraints: Before we formally prove that the constraints are satisfied, observe that the constraint (3.3) encodes the equilibrium condition. The constraint states that for every outcome b in NE (or CCE), the payoff of a player j has to be at least v j (T ) − i∈T β i , ∀T ⊆ M; otherwise, the player has an incentive to deviate from the current strategy (which contradicts the NE/CCE condition).
To show that our setting of dual variables satisfy the dual constraints, we prove the following claim. LEMMA 3.1. For any player j, any subset T ⊆ M of items, and any bid vector b, there is a bid b j (T ) for the player j such that the payoff is at least v j (T ) − i∈T max j ∈N \j {b ij }, fixing the bids of other players.
. First we discuss why the above lemma implies that our setting of dual variables satisfy the dual constraints. The above claim implies that the dual constraint 3.3 corresponding to agent j and subset T is satisfied if α j is set to
. This is because, for every outcome b we are guaranteed by the above lemma that
correlated equilibrium. Therefore, we conclude that all the dual constraints are satisfied if the lemma is true.
Proof. Now we prove the lemma. Proof of the lemma is essentially the idea used in the proof by Christodoulou et al. [19] . Number the items in the set T from 1, 2, . . . d. Consider the following bid b j (T ) for the player j: set b * ij = (v j (1, 2, . . . , i)−v j (1, 2, . . . , i − 1)) for item i ∈ T and zero for the rest. From the construction, it is true that i∈T b * ij = v j (T ) and from the submodularity of valuation function
The first inequality is true from the fact that the right most term is at most zero. The remaining inequalities follow from the construction of the bid
. Therefore, we conclude that PoA of CCE is at most 2. The crux of the entire argument is that the dual constraint 3.3 encodes the equilibrium condition, once we treat the dual variables as the payoff of agents in an equilibrium. Hence, the bound applies to general equilibrium concepts such NE or CCE. REMARK 3.1. The above proof can be modified to show that PoA of first price auction for pure NE is 1, if it exists. In the construction of bid b j (T ) for the set T , we will use the highest bid in b −j plus for some vanishingly small . But observe that b j (T ) is dependent on the prices paid in b, hence does not extend to mixed NE or CCE.
Competitive Facility Location Games
In this problem, there is a set of M clients, a set N suppliers and a set of K locations. Each client i ∈ M needs a service and has a value π i for the service (which can be interpreted as the money she is willing to pay for the service). Each supplier j ∈ N can provide the service to clients from a subset of locations S j ⊆ K. There is a cost c ik for serving the client i from the location k. We assume that c ik ≤ π i , otherwise no one would serve the client i from the location k. Each supplier chooses a single location k ∈ S j to set up the facility and offers prices to the clients. Given the prices set by suppliers, the clients choose the service provider who offers the least price (denoted by p(i, θ)).
Hence, the game consists of suppliers choosing the locations and offering the prices. An outcome of this game θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . θ n ) consists of supplier j choosing a single location θ j ∈ S j . Let K(θ) denote the set of locations chosen by the suppliers in the outcome θ; K(θ) = ∪ j {θ j }.
A supplier who opens a facility at location k can serve all the clients i for which the service cost c ik is the least (among K(θ)), and offer a price which is the second cheapest. Let P j (i, k, θ −j ) denote the profit a supplier can make serving the client i from a location k ∈ S j . Then,
Therefore, in the outcome θ each supplier j serves the client i if c iθj has the least service cost and offers the second cheapest cost. Our objective is to maximize the social welfare, denoted by W (θ), which is equal to the sum of profit made by each supplier and the savings by each client. The savings made by a client D i (θ) is equal to the difference between the value π i the client has for the service and the actual price paid by the client:
Vetta ([35] ) first established a tight bound of 2 for the PoA of pure NE in more general settings. This result was later extended by Blum et al. to other equilibrium notions [13] . Roughgarden showed how to recast these arguments in the smoothness framework to obtain matching bounds [33] . We give a new proof of these results using duality.
LP relaxation and Dual. We first write a LP relaxation for the optimization version of the problem, as shown below. Here, we have a variable x jk for every supplier j ∈ N and location k ∈ S j , which in the integral solution indicates if the supplier opens a facility at location k. The variable x ijk indicates if the supplier j serves the client i from the location k ∈ S j . The objective function measures the profit made by supplier j. Note that in the optimization version of the problem, there is no competition among the suppliers so each supplier can offer a price which is equal to the cost of serving the client i from location k and hence makes a profit of (π i − c ik ).
Let us understand the constraints. The first constraint says that each client is served by at most one supplier (from some location). The second and third constraints enforce that at most one supplier opens the facility at each location and each supplier chooses at most one location respectively. The last constraint ensures that no supplier can serve the client i from the location k without opening the facility at k. 
Observe that we see the pattern repeat: in the dual we get variables for each player, and each resource and a constraint (3.6) which beautifully encodes the equilibrium condition.
Setting The Dual Variables. For an outcome θ, let P j (θ) denote the profit made by the supplier j ∈ N and let ρ j (θ) denote the set of clients the supplier j serves. Recall that P j (i, k, θ −j ) denotes the profit the supplier j can make from location k serving the client i, fixing the strategies of other players. In this notation, P j (θ) = i∈ρj (θ) P j (i, θ j , θ −j ). Recall that the savings made by client i is D i (θ) = π i − p(i, θ), where p(i, θ) denotes the price paid by client i in the outcome θ.
Given a distribution σ in a coarse correlated equilibrium, we set the dual variables as follows.
• We set α j to the expected profit made by the supplier j under the distribution σ. That is, α j = E θ∼σ [P j (θ)].
• We set β i to the expected savings made by the client i under the distribution σ. So,
• We set z ijk to the expected profit the agent j would make if she serves the client i from the location k, fixing the strategies of other players. For an outcome θ, recall that P j (i, k, θ −j ) denotes the profit made by the supplier j from the location k serving the client i. Then, we set
• Lastly, we set γ k as the expected profit collected by the agents serving from the location k in the distribution σ.
For an outcome θ, define
Bounding The Dual Objective. From the definition of dual variables, j∈N α j + i∈M β i is the expected social welfare under the distribution σ. Further, k∈K γ k is at most the social welfare. Therefore, from the weak duality theorem,
Thus we get a bound of 2 on the PoA for CCE if the dual constraints are satisfied.
Checking The Dual Constraints. We show that dual constraints are satisfied in a pure NE θ. The proof for CCE remains exactly same except that we need to argue in terms of expectations. From our definition of the dual variables β i and z ijk , the constraints of type (3.5) are trivially satisfied. Note that the constraint is tight for the locations k, k which have the first and second cheapest service cost to the client i. For the remaining locations k, we set z ijk as zero, so
Now consider the constraints of type (3.6). Note that there is one constraint for each agent j and location i. These constraints encode the equilibrium conditions. Fix an agent j. We consider two cases. Case 1. k ∈ K(θ): In this case note that γ k = i∈M z ijk , since we set z ijk = P j (i, k, θ −j ) (which is equal to the profit agent j can make from location k, fixing the strategies of others.) Note that in the outcome θ, the agent j may have chosen some other location. However, since k ∈ K(θ), for some agent j ∈ N , θ j = k and hence, γ k = P j (θ) = i∈M z ijk . Therefore, constraints are satisfied.
Since θ is a NE, it is true that α j ≥ i∈M z ijk . Otherwise, agent j can switch to location k and increase his profit under the outcome θ. Therefore, constraints are satisfied.
This completes the proof. In all our proofs the dual constraints are satisfied precisely for the reason that outcomes are in a certain equilibrium.We will see more instances of this in future sections.
Coordination Mechanisms For Temporal Routing
Over Graphs
In this problem, we are given a graph G = (V, E) and a set N of n packets. Each packet j ∈ N has a size of p j , a weight w j and wants to travel from some source vertex h j ∈ V to some destination vertex o j ∈ V . Each edge e ∈ E has a speed ν e , which models the bandwidth or processing power of the edge e. Hence, it takes p j /ν e units of time to forward a packet j on edge e. For each packet j, we are also given the strategy space S j , which is a subset of all possible simple paths between the vertices h j and o j . Each packet j selects a path P i = (e 1 , e 2 , . . . e l ), P i ∈ S j , that begins at the source node h j and ends at the destination node o j . Furthermore, packets can start getting processed on an edge e k , k ∈ {2, . . . l}, only after it is processed completely by the preceding edge e k−1 . A packet exits the graph when it gets completely processed on the last edge e l , which is incident on the destination vertex o j . The time it takes for a packet to travel from the source to the destination is called sojourn time of the packet. The weighted sojourn time of j is equal to its weight w j times its sojourn time. We adopt the store-and-forward routing model [30] . In this model, when multiple packets want to use the same edge at the same time, a forwarding policy determines which packet goes first and rest of the packets are queued up. Moreover, we allow the forwarding policy to be preemptive in the sense that a packet being forwarded may be preempted by another packet and can be resumed at a later point of time. An outcome θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . θ n ) of this game consist of each packet choosing a path θ j ∈ S j . The cost incurred by a packet is the weighted sojourn time of the packet. In other words, if a packet j reaches the destination o j at time C j (θ) in the outcome θ, then Cost j (θ) = w j · C j (θ). Given the forwarding policy on each edge, each packet strategically chooses the path which gives it the smallest weighted sojourn time. This induces a game among the packets and we want to understand efficiency of the outcomes in some equilibrium, such as NE or CCE. The social cost is the sum of player costs:
Recall that an outcome θ is in pure NE if for every j ∈ N and for all P i ∈ S j , Cost j (θ) ≤ Cost j (i, θ −j ). Similarly, a distribution σ over outcomes of the game is a coarse correlated equilibrium if for all j ∈ N , and for all
The robust PoA is the worst case ratio of expected social cost of a distribution in CCE to the optimal solution to the instance (in non-strategic settings). Let OPT denote the optimal solution to the instance (G, N , ∪ j S j ). Then, robust PoA
Lower bound on the PoA
We first show a lower bound on the PoA for priority based forwarding policies. The lower bound holds even for the special case when all the edges have same speed and each packet is of unit length. Moreover, in our lower bound instance each packet has the same source and destination. DEFINITION 4.1. A forwarding policy on an edge is a priority based policy, if for any two packets j, j ∈ N competing to use the same edge at the same time, the policy always forwards j before j . Let S = ∪ j S j denote the union of all the strategy spaces of the users. Let D = max i∈S |P i |, denote the dilation of G. Figure 1) . Consider the following graph G: G consists of √ n/2 edge disjoint paths P 1 , P 2 , . . . P k where k = √ n/2, each of length √ n + 1, between vertices h and o. Let P i := {h, v 2 (i), . . . v √ n+1 (i), o} be the set of vertices on the path P i . There is a bad short path P in G which intersects the paths P i , ∀i ∈ [k] at the (2i − 1)-th edge. Since P is the shortest path between source and destination in the graph, it is also a shortest path to the every vertex on it. The bad path is defined P as follows:
Forwarding policies such as
The bad path intersects the path P i at the edge connecting vertices (v 2i−1 (i), v 2i (i)) ((2i − 1)-the edge) and connects the vertices (v 2i (i), (v 2(i+1)−1 (i + 1)) on the paths P i and P i+1 . Finally, there is an edge from the vertex v √ n−1 ( √ n/2) to the destination o. Therefore, length of the bad path is √ n. Note that for every path P i , the segment of the path from the vertex v 2i (i) to o has length greater than the length of the bad path from vertex v 2i (i) to o.
There is a set of n packets, each of which want to go from source h to destination o. The strategy space for each packet consists of set of all simple paths from h to o. Consider any priority based forwarding policy, which given any 2 packets j, j always forwards j. This implies that there is a strict ordering on the packets and we renumber the packets from 1, 2, . . . n using these priorities. Consider the following outcome where all the packets take the bad path P . We argue by induction that this is a NE. The first packet takes P , which from the construction is the shortest path between h and o, and hence it is in NE. Now consider j-th packet, for some 1 < j < n. Note that j-th packet can delayed only by packets in the set {1, 2, . . . j − 1}. Suppose j-th packet takes a path P i = P . Then, it will be delayed by the packets {1, 2, . . . j −1} at the edge where it intersects the path P (connecting vertices v 2i−1 and v 2i ). This is because, the length of path P from h to v 2i−1 is equal to the length of the path P i from h to v 2i−1 (Recall that the bad path is also a shortest path). Therefore, the j-th packet is delayed by all the j − 1 packets. Observe that once the (j − 1)-th packet crosses the edge connecting v 2i−1 to v 2i , j-th packet can traverse without any further delays. Therefore, for any choice of path by packet j, the total sojourn time of packet j is equal to (j − 1) + L, where L is the length of the path chosen by j-th packet. On the other hand, if j-th packet takes the path P , its sojourn time is |P | + (j − 1). Since P is the shortest path, j-th packet is in NE. We conclude that all the packets taking P is a NE.
Bounding the cost of bad NE. The social cost of this NE is n · √ n + n j j, which is at least n 2 2 . On the other hand, if 2 √ n packets are forwarded on each of the paths P i separately, then the social cost is
, which is at most O(n √ n). Hence, the PoA is at least √ n/8 which is at least D/16.
REMARK 4.1.
• Note that in our lower bound example, the length of the shortest path is also √ n. That is, min i∈S |P i | = √ n. Hence for single source, single destination case one may obtain a bound on PoA as a function of shortest path. However, one can easily change the above instance such that min i∈S |P i | is small if multiple destinations are allowed.
• The lowerbound example easily shows why Shortest Job First, Shortest Remaining Processing Time policies also fail. We simply change the lengths of packets to 1 + j , where 0 < j < 1 is an arbitrary small constant.
• The example also brings out the intrinsic difficulty of selfish routing over graphs. Note that if one removes the bad path, then PoA of routing game is at most 4. This follows from the work of [9] .
Robust PoA
In this section, we prove the PoA of CCE to be at most 4 · D 2 for the temporal routing games with arbitrary sources and destinations and packets with weights, when each edge follows the Highest Density First (HDF) forwarding policy. For a given packet j, the density of the packet is defined as the ratio of weight over processing length. That is, d ij = wj pj . Let h j , o j denote the source and destination vertices of the packet j. The strategy space for a packet j denoted by S j consists of a subset of all possible simple paths between h j to o j . Note that S j need not include all possible simple paths between (h j , o j ).
LP relaxation and Dual:
We formulate the optimization version of the routing problem as a LP. Let p ej = pj se . Consider the LP relaxation for the problem WeightedRouting − Primal given below. This relaxation is a generalization of the time indexed LP relaxation given in [3, 9] . Here, we have a variable x eijt which indicates if the packet j is being forwarded on the edge e at time t if it chooses the path P i ∈ S j . min j Pi∈Sj e∈Pi t
Let us understand the constraints first. The first constraint says that every packet chooses a path, while the second constraint enforces that each packet if it chooses path P i , then on every edge along the path the packet should be forwarded for at least p ej time units. Lastly, the third constraint says that at most 1/2·D units (instead of 1) of packets can be forwarded at any time step. This slows down the LP schedule by a factor of 1/2 · D. By standard time-stretching arguments (see [9] for more details) we note that this restriction on the LP solution only increases the cost of the solution by a factor of 2 · D. Proof. We sketch an outline of the proof, see [9] for more details.
Fix a packet j.
Consider the term
Pi∈Sj e∈Pi t x eijt in the objective function (This corresponds to +1 term in the objective). The term counts the total units of time packet j is forwarded on all the edges and is clearly a lower bound on the sojourn time of packet j. Note that this term does not include the delay a packet may suffer at the edges along its chosen path. This will be accounted by the term Pi∈Sj e∈Pi t x eijt · t pej . To understand this quantity, fix an edge e ∈ P i . We imagine the packet j as being made of p ej unit length packets. Then, t x eijt · t pej indicates the average of the time instants at which these unit length packets are being forwarded and is called fractional completion time of the packet j. Note that, if a packet is continuously forwarded in the interval [t, t + p ej ], then the fractional completion time on e will be t + p ej /2; on the other hand, the integral completion time will be t + p ej . Therefore, t x eijt · t pej gives a lower bound on the completion time of j on e. Since the completion time of a packet on any edge is a lower bound on the sojourn time of the packet j,
is at most D times the cost incurred by j. Further, we loose a factor 2 · D due to the second constraint of WeightedRouting − Primal. Therefore, we conclude that the LP is a 2 · D 2 -approximation to the optimal cost. Now we write the dual. In WeightedRouting − Dual, there is a variable α j for every packet j, a variable β et for every edge e ∈ E and time instant t. There is a variable ϑ eij for every packet j, edge e and the path P i ∈ S j .
Setting The Dual Variables:
Fix an outcome θ. Let C ej (i, θ −j ), a ej (i, θ −j ) denote the completion time and arrival time of the packet j on the edge e if it takes the path P i ∈ S j , and rest of the packets follow paths in θ −j . Let δ ej (i, θ −j ) = C ej (i, θ −j ) − a ej (i, θ −j ), denote the total time the packet j waits at the edge e. Note that δ ej (i, θ −j ) may be different for different paths even if they share the same edge. This is because, depending upon the path a packet chooses it may arrive at the same edge at different times. Finally, let Cost j (i, θ −j ) = e∈Pi w j · δ ej (i, θ −j ). Note that in our notation, Cost j (θ) is simply Cost j (θ j , θ −j ).
For any time instant t and edge e, let z et (θ) denote the total weight of all the packets which use the edge e (at some point of time) in the outcome θ and which are alive; i.e., the packets which have not reached the destination by time t. Let C j (θ) denote the sojourn time of packet j. Then, z et (θ) = j:e∈θj ,t≤Cj (θ) w j . Note that Cost j (θ) is also w j · C j (θ). Let σ be any distribution over the outcomes which is in coarse correlated equilibrium. We now set the dual variables.
• We set α j to the expected cost of the packet j in the distribution σ. That is,
• We set ϑ eij to the expected weighted delay seen by the packet j on the edge e, if j chooses the path P i and rest of the packets follow the distribution σ. More precisely,
• We set β et to the expected total weight of alive packets at time t which use the edge e in σ; Formally,
Bounding The Dual Objective: Proof. Consider an outcome θ. For every time instant t ∈ [0, C j (θ)], the packet j contributes w j to z et for each edge e in the path θ j . Observe that the total cost incurred by packet j can be expressed as Cost j (θ) = Cj (θ) t=0 w j . Therefore, the total contribution by a packet j to the term e∈θj t z et is at most the D · w j · Cost j (θ), since D is at least the length of the path j chooses. Therefore, summing over all packets we have e t z et ≤ D · j Cost j (θ). Hence,
Therefore, from the weak duality theorem
Verifying The Dual Constraints: Now we prove that for every packet j ∈ N and every strategy P i ∈ S j , the constraints 4.7 and 4.8 are satisfied if σ is a coarse correlated equilibrium. Fix a packet j, a path P i ∈ S j . To show that our definition of dual variables satisfy the constraints, it is enough if we verify the following: for every outcome θ the constraints corresponding to packet j and path P i ∈ S j are satisfied if we set α j = Cost j (i, θ −j ), ϑ eij = w j · δ ej (i, θ −j ) and β et = z et (θ). It is easy to see this for the constraint 4.8 as we set ϑ eij , β et to the expected value of δ ej (i, θ −j ), z et (θ) respectively. To show that constraints 4.7 will also be satisfied, we make use of the fact that σ is a coarse correlated equilibrium. Therefore,
Thus, we focus on showing that α j = Cost j (i, θ −j ), ϑ eij = δ ej (i, θ −j ) and β et = z et (θ) satisfy constraints 4.7 and 4.8 for every outcome θ. Clearly, constraint 4.7 is satified from the definition. Consider the constraint 4.8.
We will have two cases: 1) The constraint 4.8 corresponding to the path P i which the packet j took in the outcome θ.
2) The constraints corresponding to paths P i = θ j . We focus on the second case since it is more tricky to prove and the proof subsumes the proof of first case.
The tricky part of showing constraints (4.8) are satisfied for the second case is that, we set ϑ eij = w j · δ ej (i, θ −j ), which is the weighted delay seen by j on e in the hypothetical event that j chooses the path P i while other players play θ −j . On the other hand, the variables β et correspond to the actual outcome θ. Note that β et values may be very different in the outcomes θ and (θ j = i, θ −j ). However, as each edge follows HDF forwarding policy, a packet j gets delayed only by packets with density greater than the density of j. And these packets traverse the network oblivious to the path taken by the packet j. (This property is not true for nonpriority based forwarding policies, which is a major hurdle in analyzing them.) Hence, their contribution to β et remains unaffected. We now argue that this is enough to show that dual constraints are satisfied.
Let N (e, j, i, θ −j ) denote the set of packets which delay packet j at the edge e, when j choses the path P i . Observe that some of these packets may be partially processed on the edge e when the packet j arrives. Let q ej denote the remaining processing size of the packet j ∈ N (e, j, i, θ −j ) when j arrives at the edge e. From the definition of δ ej (i, θ −j ) we have
Since the packets in N (e, j, i, θ −j ) delay j at e, they are still alive and contribute their weight to z et . Therefore, at time t = 0,
The last inequality follows from the fact that each packet in the set N (e, j, i, θ −j ) has a density greater than the density of packet j. Since in the interval [0, t ] at most t units of packets can be processed, we have
Fix a time instant t and consider the constraint (4.8) corresponding to the job j and an edge e. We have,
Hence, the dual constraints are satisfied. Therefore, from Lemma 4.1 and 4.2 we get the robust PoA of at most 4 · D 2 . This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.1.
4.3
Price of stability for single source, multiple destination case In this section, we prove the price of stability of temporal routing games for the case when all packets have the same source and weights. The proof is obtained by a dual analysis that exploits an interesting combinatorial property of a special NE called Minimal-Shortest Path NE, which we describe below.
Recall that a ej (θ), C ej (θ) denote the arrival time and the completion time of the packet j at the edge e in the outcome θ.
DEFINITION 4.2. (MINIMAL-SHORTEST PATH NE)
An outcome θ for the temporal routing game is said to be a Minimal-Shortest Path NE, if for every packet j ∈ N and every edge e ∈ θ j , j arrives earlier than any packet j when p j > p j and e ∈ θ j ; That is, a ej (θ) ≤ a ej (θ).
LEMMA 4.3.
A Minimal-Shortest Path NE exists for every temporal routing game if the forwarding policy on each edge is Shortest Job First, every packet has the same source and the strategy space for each packet is set of all possible paths.
Proof. We prove this by induction. Let us relabel the packets in N in the increasing order of their size, the packet with the smallest size getting an index of 1 (we break ties arbitrarily). We assume that all packets start at the same vertex h and want to travel to some destination vertex o j , j ∈ N . The first packet takes a shortest or fastest path P 1 to destination o 1 from h. For the first packet, fastest path is essentially a shortest path if weight of each edge is p 1 /s e . (We will stick with the term fastest path.) Here, the fastest path is the path which minimizes the sojourn time of packet 1.
Observe that no packet j can arrive at any edge e ∈ P 1 earlier than packet 1, since it would contradict P 1 being the fastest path. Suppose packets 1, 2, . . . k − 1 satisfy the property stated in the definition. Fixing the routes taken by packets 1, 2, . . . k − 1, we construct the route for packet k as follows. We temporarily find a path P k from h to its destination o k which minimizes the sojourn time of the packet, taking into consideration the paths taken by packets smaller than k. . . h}. Therefore, from the construction no packet which has size greater than packet j can arrive at any edge on the path of j earlier than the packet j. This concludes the proof. LEMMA 4.4. In a Minimal-Shortest Path NE θ, no packet j which arrives at an edge e ∈ θ j at time a ej (θ) is delayed by a packet j arriving at time a ej (θ) > a ej (θ).
Proof. Fix a packet j and an edge e ∈ θ j . Since the forwarding policy on each edge is SJF, j can only be delayed by packets j which have smaller size. However, since θ is a Minimal-Shortest Path NE every such packet j arrives at e earlier than j. This completes the proof.
We note that this property is not true for every NE when the forwarding policy on each edge is Shortest Job First or if packets have multiple sources.
LP relaxation and Dual: Consider the LP relaxation for the problem Routing − Primal given below. This relaxation is similar to the general case with weights except for one main difference: The second constraint of the primal program says that at each time instant at most 1/2 units of packet can be routed unlike 1/2D for the Routing − Primal.
Therefore, we get the following lemma.
LEMMA 4.5. Routing − Primal is a 2D-approximation to the cost of optimal solution.
Next consider the dual. In the dual, there is a variable α j for every player j, a variable β et for every edge e ∈ E and time instant t. There is a variable ϑ eij for every packet j, edge e and a path P i ∈ S j .
Setting The Dual Variables: Fix an outcome θ which is in Minimal-Shortest Path NE. Our interpretation of the dual variables follow the standard template.
• We set α j to the cost incurred by the packet j; in other words, α j = Cost j (θ), which is the sojourn time of packet j in θ.
• Consider the variable ϑ eij corresponding to the path P i chosen by packet j in the outcome θ. That is, P i = θ j . We set ϑ eij to the total delay the packet j suffers at the edge e (which includes the time spent processing the packet). Let δ ej (θ) = C ej (θ) − a ej (θ) denote the total delay seen by j. Then, we set ϑ eij = δ ej (θ). From the definition of the variables, we have α j = e∈Pi ϑ eij .
• Consider the variables ϑ eij corresponding to the paths P i ∈ S j and P j = θ j . That is, the set of paths packet j didn't choose in the outcome θ. We set ϑ eij as the total delay the packet j would suffer on e, if the packet chose P i fixing the paths chosen by other packets (θ −j ). Recall that a ej (i, θ −j ) and C ej (i, θ −j ) denote the arrival and completion time of the packet j on the edge e if it takes the path P i fixing the paths of other packets. Let δ ej (i,
From the definition of dual variables and the fact that θ is a NE, we have α j ≤ Cost j (i, θ −j ) ∀j, P i ∈ S j .
• We set β et as follows. Let N (e, θ) ⊆ N be the set of packets which pass through the edge e (at some point of time) in the outcome θ. We imagine β et as the sum of β ejt for every packet j ∈ N (e, θ). For a packet j, we set β ejt to 1 for every time instant t ∈ [0, δ ej (θ)]. Therefore, from the weak duality theorem we get,
Checking The Dual Constraints: Fix a packet j. From the definition of dual variables and since θ is a NE, the constraints of type (4.11) (which encode the equilibrium condition) corresponding to j are satisfied. This is because,
Now consider the constraints of type (4.12). We consider two cases.
Case 1: Packet j chooses path P i in θ.
Fix an edge e ∈ P i . Recall that δ ej (θ) denotes the total time packet j spends waiting at the edge e. Consider the time interval [0, δ ej (θ)] and we need to verify that for all t ∈ [0, δ ej (θ)], the constraints (4.12) are satisfied. Note that the constraints are trivially satisfied when t > δ ej (θ). Let N (e, j, θ) be the set of packets which delay j on edge e. As each edge follows SJF policy, for every packet j ∈ N (e, j, θ), p j ≤ p j . From Lemma 4.4, all the packets in N (e, j, θ) arrive at e earlier than j. Let j * be the packet that is being processed at the edge e when j arrives at e. Let p j * denote the remaining size of packet j * when the packet j arrives. This implies that every packet j ∈ N (e, j, θ) is delayed by packet j * at least by p j * time units. By applying Lemma 4.4 to every packet j in N (e, j, θ) we conclude that (4.13) δ ej (θ) ≥ p j * + {j ∈N (e,j,θ)\j * and p j ≤p j } p j (The above inequality is crucial in verifying the dual constraints and is true only if Lemma 4.4 holds. Unfortunately, this is not the case with every NE. Thus, we loose another factor D in PoA.)
Consider the packets in the set N (e, j, θ) and index them in the increasing order of their size breaking ties arbitrarily. Consider a time instant t in the interval [0, δ ej (θ)] . Let k denote the smallest index of the packet in N (e, j, θ) such that k i=1 p j ≥ t. We can express δ ej (θ) as follows.
However, since each packet j in the set N (e, j, θ) is smaller than the packet j,
Therefore, for every time instant t we can upper bound the total delay seen by j at e by (4.14)
From our definition of dual variable β et and from the equation (4.13) it follows that (4.15)
The '+1' in the equation is due to the contribution of packet j to the term β et . We are ready to verify that constraints are satisfied at t. Consider the constraint of type(4.12). From equations (4.14) and (4.15) we get,
Case 2: Packet j does not choose path P i ∈ S j in θ. We need to verify that constraints (4.12) hold for the paths P i ∈ S j not chosen by the packet j. Only difference between the this case and the first case is that ϑ eij is set to δ ej (i, θ −j ) which is the total time packet j waits at the edge e in the hypothetical outcome where packet j takes path P i , while other packets follows paths in θ −j . On the other hand β et is defined with respect to the outcome ϑ where job j takes path θ j . In particular, if the forwarding policy on each edge is not SJF, then the set of packets seen by job j in the outcome θ can be very different from the set of packets job j sees in the outcome where j takes the path P i and remaining packets take paths in θ −j .
However, since each edge follows SJF, the set of packets which can delay packet j remain unaffected by this hypothetical switching of strategy by the packet j. In other words, the schedule of packets which are smaller than packet j remains exactly the same in the outcome θ and the outcome where j follows path P i and other packets follow paths in θ −j . Hence, the contribution of those packets to the dual variable β et remains unchanged. We now argue that this is enough to show that constraints are satisfied.
Let N (e, j, i, θ −j ) be the set of packets which delay j on the edge e if j switches to the path P i . Repeating the arguments from the case (1), we can write for every time instant t ∈ [0, ϑ eij ] an equation similar to eqn(4.14):
Similarly we have,
Observe that unlike eqn(4.15) we do not have '+1' in above equation as j does not take the path P i in θ. Consider the dual constraints,
Therefore, we get a bound of 4D from Lemma (4.5) and Lemma (4.6) on the inefficiency of Minimal-Shortest Path NE. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.3 4.4 Tree Topologies A special case of our problem considered by Bhattacharya et al. [9] is the following : We are given a rooted tree and all packets start at the root. For each packet j, we are also given a set L j , which is simply a subset of nodes of the tree. A job j starts at the root and wants to exit the tree through any one of the nodes in L j . Given a forwarding policy, each job selects a destination vertex in L j which gives it the minimum completion time and this induces a game among the packets. Our objective is to bound the PoA of resulting game. Bhattacharya et al. [9] showed that the PoA of pure NE for the game is O(log 2 ν), where ν is the ratio of maximum speed to minimum, for the case when packets have same weight.
We observe that for this problem, Lemma 4.4 applies for every NE. Therefore, we can set the dual variables as defined in the price of stability analysis and we get an improved bound of O(log ν) for the problem. A closer look at the proof reveals that the entire analysis even generalizes to coarse correlated equilibrium. Thus, we conclude that the PoA of CCE for tree network is O(log ν).
THEOREM 4.1. The PoA of CCE for the temporal routing problem on rooted tree networks is at most O(log ν).
We note that the analysis in [9] only applies to pure NE. We omit the details of the proof due to space constraints.
Energy Minimization Games in Machine Scheduling
We study the problem of energy minimization in machine scheduling from a game theoretic perspective. In this problem, we are given a set M of machines and a set N of jobs . Each job j has a processing requirement of p ij , a weight w ij on machine i. Each machine i can run at a variable speed η(i, t) by paying an energy cost of η(i, t) γ , γ ≥ 2. (In practice γ = 2, 3. We can extend our results to arbitrary energy functions, but for the sake of clarity we consider polynomial functions.) The objective is to design a speed scaling policy and a machine scheduling policy such that we minimize the total energy consumed while simultaneously guaranteeing a certain quality of service, such as average completion times of jobs. One of the most commonly used algorithms for the problem is the following.
Machine Scheduling Policy. Each machine follows the Highest Density First (HDF) scheduling policy.
Speed Scaling Policy. We set the speed of machine i at time t such that the total energy cost is equal to the total fractional weight of jobs at time t. For a job j, let the fractional weight at time t be defined as pij (t) pij · w ij , where p ij (t) be the remaining processing length of job j at time t. Let W it (θ) denote the total fractional weight of jobs at time t on machine i in an outcome θ. Then,
Note that since we use HDF, there can be at most one job that is partially processed at any given instant of time. The setting of speed equal to fractional weight is only for the sake of technical convenience.
We study this problem in the game theoretic setting. In this setting, we assume that each job is a strategic agent and chooses the machine which minimizes its weighted completion time. An outcome of this game consists of each job j ∈ N choosing a machine i ∈ M. Given an outcome θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . θ n ), where θ j denotes the machine job j chooses, let C j (θ) denote the completion time of job j in the outcome θ. Then,
The social cost for an outcome is the sum of players cost + energy consumed. Formally,
Our objective is to understand the PoA of this game for general equilibrium concepts such CCE.
Robust PoA bound
We first observe that for any outcome θ, the sum of weighted completion time of jobs is at most i t W it (θ)dt (Indeed, it would have been equal i t W it (θ)dt, if W it denoted the total integral weight of jobs at time t). The speed scaling policy ensures that in any outcome the total energy cost is at most the total weighted completion time of jobs, so we focus on the latter quantity.
Convex Programming Relaxation and Dual. Let,
and
Consider the following convex programming relaxation for the problem due to [3, 23] . In this relaxation, there is a variable x ijt which indicates the speed at which the job j is processed at time t on machine i. The constraints of Energy − Primal state that each job needs to be completely processed and the speed of machine i at time t is equal to the sum of individual speeds of the jobs.
We give a brief explanation on why the objective function is an O(1)-approximation to the cost of optimal solution. See [23, 3] for a complete proof of this claim. The first term in the objective function lower bounds the weighted completion of jobs. The second term corresponds to the energy cost of the schedule. We use a scaling factor of 1 + , where = γ γ−1 . This will be useful in the dual analysis. Note that this only increases the cost of objective function by a constant factor. The third term is a lower bound on the total cost any optimal solution has to pay to schedule a job j, assuming that j is the only job present in the system. This term is needed, as we do not explicitly put any constraints on disallowing simultaneous processing of jobs across machines. Without this term, Energy − Primal has a huge integrality gap as a single job can be processed to an extent of 1 m simultaneously on all machines.
We write the dual of Energy − Primal following the framework given in [23] . Just like all the LP and CP relaxations we wrote earlier, we have a variable β it for each machine i and time instant t, and a variable α j for each job j. ) is a constant we get in the Fenchel dual of function x γ . Setting The Dual Variables: Let σ be a distribution in a coarse correlated equilibrium. Our interpretation of the dual variables is as follows.
• We set α j proportional to the expected cost incurred by the player j in σ. That is,
• We set β it to the total expected fractional weight of jobs at time t divided by the speed of machine i. More precisely,
REMARK 5.1. For the readers familiar with the online version of the problem, we highlight the differences. Our setting of the dual variable α j is different from the dual-fitting proof for the problem in the onlinse setting used in [23, 3] . In the online version of the problem, α j is set to the marginal increase in the cost of the objective due to job j. Note that such a setting of dual variable won't work for our problem. The jobs select machines depending on their own weighted completion time not the increase in the objective caused by them. However, some of the technical lemmas essentially follow from [23, 3] .
Bounding The Dual Objective: From the weak duality theorem, the cost of primal program is
The second inequality follows from Jensen's inequality and also note that i,t W it (θ) is equal to the weighted completion-time of jobs in the outcome θ. As already observed, the primal program is at most O(1)-approximation to the optimal cost. Since the energy cost of the schedule is equal to the total weighted completion time, we loose another factor of 2. Therefore, we get a bound of O(γ) on the PoA of CCE 2 . Checking The Constraints. It remains to verify that our setting of the dual variables satisfy the dual constraints. We note that technical details of the proofs in this part are similar to the proofs in [3, 23] and we omit few details.
Recall that for every job j, machine i, and time instant t we have a constraint,
We first prove that for every outcome θ, the constraint corresponding to j, i and t is satisfied if we set β it = W γ−1/γ it (θ) and α j = (1 − 1/γ) · Cost j (i, θ −j ). This would imply that the constraint corresponding to a fixed j, i and t triple is satisfied in expectation if α j = (1 − 1/γ) · E θ∼σ [Cost j (i, θ −j )] and β it = E θ∼σ [W γ−1/γ it (θ)]. Once we show this, we use the fact that σ is a coarse correlated equilibrium and E θ∼σ [Cost j (θ)] = min i E θ∼σ [Cost j (i, θ −j )], which will complete the proof.
Fix an outcome θ. We focus on proving that β it = W γ−1/γ it (θ) and α j = (1 − 1/γ) · Cost j (i, θ −j ) satisfy the constraint 5.18 for the job j, machine i and time instant t. Two cases arise: (a) the job j chose machine i in the outcome θ and (b) the job chose machine i = θ j . We prove case (b) since it subsumes case (a). Proving case (b) is tricky because α j is defined with respect to the hypothetical event that the job j chose machine i, while β it is defined with respect to the actual outcome θ. Let θ := (θ j = i, θ −j ) denote this hypothetical outcome. Note that W it (θ ) = W it (θ). This is because, in the outcome θ , the total weight of jobs on the machine i is strictly more than the outcome θ and hence the machine runs faster in the outcome θ . Let T j denote the first time instant in θ when the job j gets executed. The figure illustrates the schedule on machine i in the outcome θ (top) and θ (bottom). The job j in the outcome θ is represented by the solid block. Note that in θ , the machine runs faster because of the weight of job j. Therefore, W it (θ) ≥ W it (θ ) − w ij , till the job j starts getting processed in θ . LEMMA 5.1. W it (θ) ≥ W it (θ ) − w ij , ∀t < T j .
Proof. Let J(j, θ) denote the set of jobs which have density more than the density of job j on machine i. Hence, the jobs in the set J(i, θ) get executed first in both θ and θ . However, since the machine runs faster in θ (we set the speed such that energy cost is equal to the total remaining fractional weight) the jobs in the set J(i, θ) finish earlier in θ than θ. Thus, W it (θ) ≥ W it (θ ) − w ij , ∀t < T j . See Figure 2 for an illustration.
Therefore, if we show that constraints are satisfied for θ , then the constraints are also satisfied for θ as β it can be only higher. Proof. We give a brief outline of the proof here. See [3] for more details. Consider any small interval of time [u, u + du]. In this interval, the total weight of jobs decreases by dW ≥
